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CASE COMMENTS

or qualification on the absolute promise to pay. This case shows
an early disposition of the court to reject the results which would
obtain under the single contract theory.
The question may arise as to how a situation similar to the one
involved in the principal case would be treated under the Uniform
Commercial Code. A recent Pennsylvania case is of particular interest in this respect because it was decided after the effective
date of the Code in that state. According to First Nat'l Bank of
Philadelphiav. Anderson, 5 Bucks 287, 7 D.&C.2d 661 (Pa. 1956),
a similar result would be reached. There, the maker of a promisory
note alleged that the payee under the note had failed to complete
the work called for in the related contract and had supplied defective material. He further asserted that P, the assignee of the note,
had failed to ascertain whether the contract supporting the note
had been satisfactorily completed by the payee, and died therefore not occupy the status of a holder in due course. The court held
that one taking a negotiable note was not obliged to inquire into
the performance of the underlying contract in order to qualify as
a holder in due course.
Thus, it would appear that West Virginia is in line with the
strong majority view as to the defenses of which the assignee takes
free as a holder in due course. Further, with regard to the problems raised in this comment, the Uniform Commercial Code will
not effect a change in the law of this jurisdiction.
John Ralph Lukens

Procedure-Effect of Dismissal of Venue-Giving Defendant
Administrator of an estate brought a wrongful death action
against three Ds in X county and only one of the Ds was a resident
of X county. Accident occurred in Y county. During the trial, P dismissed the action as to the D who was the resident of X county and
through whom the P obtained venue as to the nonresident Ds. The
case was then tried on the merits and a verdict was returned for P.
After the adverse verdict, one of the nonresident Ds made a motion
to set aside the verdict on the grounds that the court lacked venue.
Motion was overruled and D appealed. Held, affirmed. When D
proceeded with the trial of the case without raising the question of
venue in any manner, he subjected himself to a trial of the case

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1963

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 1 [1963], Art. 13

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

on its merits. This constituted a waiver of the right to object to
venue. Lester v. Rose, 130 S.E.2d 80 (W. Va. 1963).
The West Virginia Code on the subject of venue in general provides that any action may be brought in the circuit court of any
county where any of the defendants may reside. W. VA. CODE
ch. 56, art 1, § I (Michie 1961).
In the instant case, the dismissal of the venue-giving defendant
gave the nonresident defendant the right to object to venue. A
discussion of the problems involved in different types of dismissals
of the venue-giving defendant may be found in Miller, Sovm
PNoBLEMs IN VENUE AND JtmmDIcroN,

49 W. Va. L. Q. 112 (1943).

The right to object to improper venue is a personal privilege
which may be waived by the party entitled to assert it. Hutchinson
v. Steinke, 353 S.W.2d 137 (Mo. App. 1962). A nonresident defendant, by pleading to the merits and participating in the trial,
however, does not waive the right to object to venue when a resident defendant is eliminated. Jordan v. Martin Distrib. Co., 90 Ga.
App. 186, 82 S.E.2d 263 (1954). Any objection to venue by a
nonresident defendant after the dismissal of the resident defendant,
must be made timely and before a verdict is returned. Stevens V.
Gilliam, 220 Ark. 867, 251 S.W.2d 241 (1952). A nonresident defendant also waives the right to object to venue when, after the
dismissal of the resident defendant, he files an additional pleading
to the merits of the case. Harley v. Harley, 217 Ga. 205, 121 S.E.2d
640 (1961).
The nonresident defendant might be faced with the problem of
the dismissal of the resident defendant in four situations: (1) before motion or answer by any of the defendants; (2) after motion
but before answer; (3) after both motion and answer but before
trial; and (4) during the trial as in the instant case.
In the first situation, it is clear that an objection to venue by a
nonresident defendant can be raised either by motion or answer.
W. VA. R.C.P. 12(b). If the nonresident defendant makes a motion, he must assert all defenses then available to him by motion
or they are waived. Spencer v. Northwest Orient Airlines, 201 F.
Supp. 504 (S.D. N.Y. 1962). Although there is some authority for
the proposition that any defense then available by motion and not
asserted in a motion may be asserted by answer, the Spencer case,
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supra, represents the better view. 1A BARON & HoLTzoFF,
PRAcrcE & PNocmDunr 11
370 (1960).

FEDERAL

Second, where the nonresident defendant has already made a
motion, but before his answer, the resident defendant is dismissed,
it seems that the nonresident defendant should be able to challenge
venue by either motion or answer. A waiver of defenses only
occurs if the defendant fails to raise a defense "then available" to
him. W. VA. R.C.P. 12(g) & (h). For this reason it would appear
that the nonresident defendant would not waive any defense not
available to him at the time he made his motion. In Frank v.
Broumell, 149 F. Supp. 928 (D.D.C. 1957), defendant's failure to
object to venue was not a waiver where the complaint was insufficient to put the defendant on notice of an issue upon which an
objection to venue could be made.
In the third and fourth situations which occur after the answer
and either before or during the trial, the basic question is how
soon the nonresident defendant must raise the objection to venue
after the dismissal of the resident defendant before the right to
object is waived. In the light of the Harley case, supra, in which
waiver occurred when the nonresident defendant filed an additional
pleading, it would appear that any affirmative action by the nonresident defendant, other than an objection to venue, might constitute a waiver of the right to object to venue. This would indicate that an objection to venue should be made immediately after
the dismissal of the resident defendant regardless of the stage of
the proceedings and before any other action is taken.
Frank Thomas Graft, Jr.

Sales--Notice Filing Under Uniform Commercial Code
D loaned money to A, a restauranteur, who by a security agreement, conveyed the contents of his restaurant and all after-acquired
property to D, who filed a financing statement in accordance with
the Uniform Commercial Code. P then entered into a conditional
sale contract with A for the sale of a cash register, delivered the
chattel to A, but failed to file a financing statement within the
ten-day grace period specified by the Uniform Commercial Code.
A subsequently defaulted on both obligations. D sold the cash
register. P brought an action of tort for conversion. The trial court

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1963

3

